



Rapporteur's Report

Social Development

Course "Global Technology Governance: Big Tech Companies & Artificial Intelligence"
20 and 21 May 2025
SP -SELA/GGT:BTCIA- IR-25

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C O N T E N T S

I.	INTRODUCTION	1
II.	OPENING SESSION	2
III.	DEVELOPMENT OF THE COURSE	3
IV.	CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	7
V.	INDICATORS	11
VI.	PROJECT DESCRIPTION	12
VII.	STAGES OF THE PROJECT	12
VIII.	SWOT MATRIX	21
IX.	INDICATOR MATRICES	22

Tuesday, 20 May 2025

I. INTRODUCTION

For the fifth consecutive year, SELA, in partnership with the European Institute of International Studies (IEEI-Sweden), with the collaboration of the Pontifical University of Salamanca (UPSA) in Spain and as part of its training programme for diplomats and senior officials in areas related to diplomacy, technology and cyberspace governance, is promoting the development of negotiating skills as an essential part of the training of such personnel with a view to optimising their understanding of the application of diplomacy to the political and geopolitical problems specific to cyberspace. To that end, on 20 and 21 May this year, it coordinated the course ["Global Technology Governance: Big Tech Companies & Artificial Intelligence."](#) delivered virtually.

The global international scene is clearly marked by many changes that are already being heralded in the field of technology, such as the impact of AI on writing, translation, programming and scientific areas such as mathematics, physics, medicine and economics, among many others. It is estimated that, this year, AI could surpass human capabilities in areas such as health sciences, economics and scientific research in general, with profound implications ranging from the acceleration of scientific discovery to the psychological and social challenges of accepting this change.

Outside the technological sphere and, paradoxically, as a result of technology itself, global dynamics demand that the institutions responsible for the international agenda place Internet governance and international cybersecurity at the centre of their foreign policy and international strategies, as well as the interrelationship they must develop with the technology industry. To this end, it is essential to have specialised and up-to-date personnel in all matters concerning the development of the technology industry, with knowledge and skills that enable them to effectively perform their role in the management of international governance and cybersecurity.

Currently, the digital age is led and governed by the so-called Big Tech Companies, which use Artificial Intelligence (AI) to produce their goods and services, increase their economic power, and give their external actions significant geopolitical implications that impact the international community, not always in line with its interests. In fact, both factors (economic and geopolitical) have turned Big Tech Companies into the new global players. AI is having a strong impact on sectors such as transport, banking, finance, education and health. It is therefore changing traditional economic, financial and commercial systems and affecting the processes of human talent formation in the countries where its impact is greatest and the health of their populations. Likewise, the use of AI causes alterations in countries' political systems through actions by companies or powerful and influential groups that carry out information and disinformation campaigns, even in electoral processes and, sometimes, in specific political situations.

Cyberspace, the new non-physical region, has been created and is managed by Big Tech Companies, most of which are American and Chinese. In this regard, Latin American and Caribbean countries, along with other blocs of countries, share the common challenge of having to engage in a digital transition that is fair and balanced for all.

The growing use of AI in an equally growing variety of processes, actions and situations requires countries to review and reconceptualise their international relations, as well as their foreign policy and diplomatic priorities. Knowing and understanding what is happening in the world is an existential imperative and a responsibility of diplomats as key players in a country's foreign service. This responsibility involves developing policies appropriate to the current and future world and

2

designing, implementing and updating an effective foreign policy with third countries at the bilateral, regional, interregional and multilateral levels.

This course is part of the Social Development Area, specifically Activity 2: Geopolitical and Diplomatic Implications of Artificial Intelligence of Project B: Capacity Building for the Regional Public Sector of Programme I: Sustainable and Resilient Development, as outlined in SELA's Work Programme for 2022-2026, updated in 2025. All content was provided by renowned experts from IEEI-Sweden and the Pontifical University of Salamanca (Spain). The activity was moderated by Gustavo Herrera, SELA Social Development Coordinator, and Sayed Durán, SELA Social Development Analyst.

II. OPENING SESSION

The opening remarks were delivered by the following personalities:

Ambassador Clarems Endara, Permanent Secretary of SELA. In greeting and welcoming the attendees, he expressed the interest of the organisation he heads in continuing to programme and coordinate courses aimed at academic diplomats and senior officials in areas related to diplomacy. He commented that the purpose of this course is to strengthen negotiating skills and promote a deep understanding of the application of diplomacy in resolving political and geopolitical challenges. He stated that “we live in an era of unprecedented transformation in which technology shapes every aspect of our lives” and that “at the epicentre of this revolution are large technology companies, giants that have transcended borders and whose power and influence rival and even transcend those of many countries and regions”. He added that, in this scenario, “artificial intelligence (AI) is emerging as a disruptive force with amazing potential, but also with profound questions about its control and direction.”

He noted that AI positively influences public opinion formation, access to information, and government transparency, but that it can also be used to spread misinformation and undermine public trust. He pointed out that this technology adds an even greater layer of complexity to this scenario and that its ability to learn, adapt, and make autonomous decisions poses unprecedented ethical, legal, and security challenges. He added that the absence of a coherent global governance framework creates a dangerous vacuum because it allows for the proliferation of divergent standards, unfair competition, and the potential erosion of fundamental rights. Regulatory fragmentation hinders responsible innovation and opens the door to large-scale exploitation and manipulation.

Ambassador Endara added that the diversity of regulations in different countries hinders the implementation of global standards and that the lack of international agreements creates an environment of uncertainty and unfair competition. He expressed his confidence that once the European Union regulation is implemented, it will serve as a reference for regions such as Latin America and the Caribbean to adapt it to their reality.

He stated that we face challenges such as ethics and responsibility with regard to AI, since automated decision-making, algorithmic bias and privacy implications are precisely what cause certain problems in its development. Advanced technologies, including AI, can exacerbate economic inequality as countries and communities with fewer resources struggle to access the tools and capabilities necessary to benefit from these innovations.

With regard to security and cyber threats, the rise of technology poses risks to cybersecurity and is one of the central themes that motivated these training courses. Governance should ensure data protection and system integrity against potential threats.

3

In relation to sustainability and the environment, technology has the potential to contribute to sustainability, but it can also have negative effects on the environment, so it is crucial to develop frameworks that promote a sustainable approach.

With regard to transparency and accountability, he said that there is excellent experience in some European countries that specifically include this when providing transparency and greater visibility to public events.

Finally, he expressed his confidence that this course would have a significant impact on the countries and institutions represented by the various participants.

Ambassador Alejandro Garofali Acosta, President of the European Institute of International Studies (EIIIS-Sweden). After welcoming the participants, he commented that this course is aimed at strengthening their negotiating skills, broaden their horizons, manage complex critical contexts, and familiarise themselves with analytical tools that will enable them to project their work on such important issues as the impact of Big Tech technologies and artificial intelligence on the global landscape and the work of diplomacy, and how this technology is transforming the traditional dynamics of international relations, diplomacy, and geopolitics. Finally, he wished the participants a very intense and productive conference.

III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COURSE

Facilitators:

José Beraún Aranibar, Professor at EIIIS-Sweden, spoke on the topic "Diplomacy in the age of artificial intelligence: new challenges and opportunities." He discussed the evolution of the relationship between diplomacy and technology and the shaping of diplomacy in the 20th century, offering a historical retrospective. He then highlighted what he called two key visions for the 21st century through a review of the work of two of diplomacy's greatest exponents. Regarding the first, Harold Nicolson, he discussed ethical diplomacy, traditional diplomacy, democratic diplomacy, and idealistic diplomacy, as well as the qualities of the ideal diplomat (truthfulness, precision, and courtesy) and the tensions between national interests and moral principles. He also noted that Nicolson inspired the principles contained in the United Nations Charter (sovereign equality; peaceful settlement of disputes; prohibition of the use of force and non-intervention; cooperation; and human rights).

He then discussed realist diplomacy, which focuses on power. He summarized Hans Morgenthau's work, emphasized international politics as a struggle for power, and explained the tension between morality and political effectiveness. He also discussed Morgenthau's principles of realism: politics is governed by objective laws; national interest is identified with power; abstract morality diverges from politics; and the autonomy of international politics.

Next, he compared the two authors and discussed the international landscape of the 20th century (world wars; the Cold War; decolonization; traditional diplomacy; defined geopolitical blocs) and then that of the 21st century (multipolarity; growing uncertainty; new actors: technology companies and social media; global challenges: climate change, pandemics, artificial intelligence).

4

Mario Torres Jarrín, Director of the Institute of European Studies and Human Rights of the Pontifical University of Salamanca (UPSA) – Spain, spoke on the topic of Big Tech, artificial intelligence and international relations. He made some general remarks regarding: the first time the term Artificial Intelligence (AI) was used in 1956, at the Dartmouth Conference organised by the American mathematician John McCarthy, defining AI as “the science and engineering of making intelligent machines”; the design, in 1957, of the first “artificial neural network” by Frank Rosenblat; the publication, in 1961, by Marvin Minsky (co-founder of the IMT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory), of the article [Steps Towards Artificial Intelligence](#); and the creation, in the 1980s, by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry, of a “fifth-generation computer” capable of performing numerous calculations using massive parallelism.

Raymond Kurzweil’s prediction in 2005, in which he announced that machines would reach human levels of intelligence by 2029 and that by 2045 they would have surpassed the intelligence of our civilisation by a trillion times, with the estimate that by then AI would have reached its full potential, becoming a Super Artificial Intelligence, and that human brains would be connected to “the cloud.”

He offered some thoughts on the following question regarding AI: Why regulate or govern artificial intelligence? In this regard, he referred to the violation of certain rights and how these are infringed upon through the application of AI: privacy; non-discrimination; freedom of expression; freedom of thought and opinion; personal data; and human dignity, among others.

He went on to explain that the international system is made up of nation states; international organisations; regional integration bodies (regional unions / the European Union); and NGOs, as well as international foundations that become key players due to their external activities and their role as external stakeholders that influence, promote and implement development policies and ideologies which ultimately affect or alter the political, social and cultural systems of societies. He then referred to the Big Tech Companies, whose economic and political power in shaping the global agenda and in international affairs, he said, is not properly recognised. Finally, he made some remarks on Tech for Democracy, a Denmark-led initiative launched in the run-up to the first US Summit for Democracy in 2021, which culminated in the second Summit in 2023.

Jesús Argumosa, Director of the Chair in Geopolitics and Strategic Studies at EIIIS-Sweden, spoke on artificial intelligence and geopolitics. He focused his presentation on power and its distribution across the world in relation to the use and development of AI. Referring to the general characteristics of this technology, he emphasised that we are all aware it is a central issue. With regard to geopolitics, he said that it is broadly about power relations and that it has capabilities that allow it to influence public opinion and, furthermore, “undermines or can undermine” democracy. In fact, he added, AI is currently being used for this purpose by a number of domestic and foreign authors and stakeholders. He noted that China and the United States are leading the way, but that other countries are developing highly advanced AI capabilities, within the context of fierce competition that will eventually lead to greater tensions in the international system. He pointed out, by way of example, that ChatGPT is currently the fastest-growing AI application, having grown by 150% in the first quarter of this year compared to 2024, and that this growth has been linked to the incorporation of creative features. Thus, image generation, for example, has been key to this chatbot reaching 400 million users in February of this year.

Afterwards, he highlighted the range of advantages and benefits that AI brings in terms of innovation, creativity and the enhancement of human safety, as well as process optimisation, amongst many others. He then discussed the risks and challenges arising from the use of this technology and how such risks have led to a concern for establishing international ethical standards to regulate its application. In this regard, he cited initiatives by the European Union and the UN.

Wednesday, 21 May 2025

Antonio Núñez y García Saúco. Professor at IIEE-Sweden, spoke on the topic of Regulation and global governance of AI. He began his presentation by clarifying the concepts he would be addressing, namely: globalisation, artificial intelligence, and regulation. Globalisation, he explained, is the increasingly intense interconnection or interrelation between peoples, nations and states and, therefore, he noted, it is a process.

He went on to point out that globalism is the ideology or intellectual movement that drives and promotes this interconnection; in other words, it promotes globalisation and globality. It is the result or the level that, at a given moment, this interconnection among peoples, nations and states has reached. Therefore, he said, globalisation is the process that began in the modern era, continues to the present day and is moving towards an ever deeper and more vigorous interconnection among peoples, nations and states. He then recalled that globalisation emerged from three specific factors, namely: i) intellectual, philosophical and scientific; ii) economic and industrial; and iii) techno-scientific; and proceeded to summarise each of them.

He referred to how the focus of inquiry shifted from the philosophical to the scientific realm, so that it became predominantly scientific and less philosophical; this led to the adoption of a practical, inductive, synthetic and pragmatic approach, as it is based on observation from which it synthesises general principles, such as the effect of gravity—a specific fact— according to which every object, not subject, tends to fall. He added that such an understanding helps expand knowledge and then, with the advent of the principles of pragmatism (science is directed towards applied knowledge) and utilitarianism, science was applied to economics and industry, leading to the initial revolutions that brought about transport and industrialisation, thereby driving the transition from an agricultural to a modern society.

The third revolution, he said, was the digital revolution: the first computers, electronics and telecommunications, leading up to the advent of the Internet, which in turn ushered in the fourth revolution with Artificial Intelligence (born out of computer science), Big Data, Machine Learning, the Internet of Things, advanced robotics, biotechnology and quantum computing, among others. He summed up by saying that the process of globalisation we see today is the result of more than two and a half centuries of evolution.

Finally, he raised key questions regarding AI in terms of its usefulness and the possibility of it surpassing human intelligence, along with all the uncertainties and potential threats that might lie ahead. In this regard, he commented that with the emergence of generative AI (a branch of artificial intelligence focused on creating new content, such as text, images, audio, video and code), the question arose as to whether research should be put on hold “until we know where we stand and what the potential risks are, and until we have complete control over the intelligence we are creating.” He finally summarized the paradox that, according to some, arises between the need to regulate AI and, on the other hand, the impossibility of regulating it because it is a cross-cutting technology that does not function without other technologies and whose operation cannot be isolated, “meaning there is no defined space that can be set aside for it.” He concluded by referring

6

to the position of those who believe it is possible to regulate AI through regulations that are not static, but adaptable and agile, capable of keeping pace with developments.

Naiara Posenato, a researcher at IIEE-Sweden and Associate Professor at the University of Rome, spoke about Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the judiciary. She offered some reflections on the use of AI within the judiciary, analysing both its specific potential benefits in that context and the risks that its implementation may entail, as well as some of the regulatory initiatives currently underway. Her focus centred on the use of AI by the judiciary, in particular by judges and magistrates, leaving aside a more detailed analysis of the use of these tools by other legal practitioners, such as lawyers. He added that the adoption of AI by judges and courts directly touches upon fundamental principles such as the right to a fair trial, transparency in decision-making, and the democratic legitimacy of the exercise of judicial functions—all elements directly linked to the concept of the rule of law, particularly in matters relating to the use of AI within the state justice system.

She went on to remark that, for a long time, the legal world showed little interest in technology. Thus, law and technology remained in separate spheres until, simultaneously, biotechnology and ICT emerged and caught the attention of legislators. That, she said, was the first stage of their convergence. The second stage coincided with the emergence of AI, such that machine learning, blockchain, surveillance and recognition technologies, among others, have placed technology at the centre of contemporary legal and ethical debate to the extent, she said, that today the impact of AI on the legal world is evident in multiple dimensions and no legal sector remains untouched by this phenomenon. In light of technologies that are profoundly transforming social relations, the various branches of law have been called upon to rethink economic and legal principles, methods and objectives.

Alejandro Garofali Acosta, President of EIIS-Sweden, spoke about the challenges and opportunities for foreign services in the digital age. He examined how AI is transforming foreign services within the global digital context; identified specific opportunities and challenges for Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC); and highlighted some significant international initiatives and regional experiences, such as the UN's Global Digital Compact. In this regard, he offered some reflections on AI as a disruptive and transformative tool; he analysed AI versus human intelligence, highlighting their complementary nature in complex decision-making; and discussed the relationship between global digital governance and diplomacy as a global public good. He also referred to the strategic adaptation resulting from technological cooperation through specialised institutes and soft power.¹ He illustrated such cooperation with the examples of Chile and Estonia, countries that have applied AI in cybersecurity and digital consular processes.

When discussing the challenges facing foreign services and the future of digital diplomacy in the age of AI, he highlighted three key aspects: i) regulations: cybersecurity laws in the EU and regional strategies in Latin America and the Caribbean; ii) capacity building: SELA proposes a regional forum on technology governance; and iii) multilateral cooperation: the UN is promoting the "Global Digital Compact."

With regard to the relationship between AI and fundamental values, he highlighted: i) ethical priorities: Pope Francis's call for technology to protect human dignity; ii) inclusion and sustainability: SELA's active role in promoting the reduction of the digital divide in the region; and iii) diplomacy as a cornerstone of global equity and development.

¹ Soft power refers to a country's ability to influence others through attraction and persuasion, rather than through the hard power of coercion or financial inducement. Essentially, it is the influence a country exerts by being perceived as attractive, respected and worthy of emulation.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the concepts, judgements, reflections and opinions expressed both at the opening session and during the delivery of the contents by the expert facilitators and the interventions of the moderators, as well as their reactions to the concerns expressed by the participants, some statements of a conclusive nature and others of a propositional nature are included.

A. CONCLUSIONS

- 1) Diplomacy in the age of artificial intelligence requires combining the best of the traditions of Harold Nicolson (ethics, transparency) and Hans Morgenthau (realism, pragmatism) with a deep understanding of the new technological landscape.
- 2) Artificial Intelligence will not replace diplomats, but it will profoundly transform how states interact, how data is processed and how global political narratives are constructed. In this context, diplomacy remains not only relevant, but indispensable.
- 3) Diplomacy is not in crisis. Today, it is not enough to read political theories to understand what diplomacy has been; rather, we are realising that, just like disruptive technologies, diplomacy must be extraordinarily dynamic and swift in order to adapt and thus efficiently address the respective challenges. Such work is, fundamentally, the responsibility of diplomats.
- 4) Diplomacy has proven itself to be a vibrant and absolutely essential discipline. If we allow self-interest and the lust for power to prevail, we will end up living in a world very different from the one we managed to build in the 20th century – a prospect that is far from desirable. The diplomat's mission in today's world is to ensure that the international order established at the end of the Second World War—despite all its negative aspects, but with all the principles that were created and strengthened—is upheld; we must move forward and not follow other principles that may be created with the aid of technologies such as AI.
- 5) In terms of risks, the growing presence of AI raises concerns about access, loss of human control, manipulation and disinformation. However, the opportunities include, among other things, information processing, predictive analysis and more agile multilateral dialogue.
- 6) Regarding the role of diplomacy in the age of AI, it is worth noting that it is a key tool for managing uncertainty; it raises the need to adapt classical principles to a new concept and its emergence as a mediator among values, interests, power and technology.
- 7) Diplomacy must become more agile, ethical and technologically advanced, capable of contributing to the achievement of a new balance between principles and power, which, in turn, makes international dialogue—the very *raison d'être* of diplomacy—more necessary than ever.
- 8) Artificial intelligence is reshaping the rules of power and international relations (global transformation).
- 9) An active, technical and ethical diplomatic approach is needed (adaptive diplomacy).
- 10) International cooperation is required to regulate the risks of artificial intelligence (global governance).
- 11) States must protect their data, technology and autonomy (digital sovereignty).

8

- 12) There is an urgent need to establish inclusive, safe and human rights-centred standards (ethical frameworks).
- 13) International treaties (international law and human rights) need to be amended.
- 14) The outcome of the dispute between the United States and China will largely determine the future of alliances among countries.
- 15) The world order as we used to know it has been reshaped by the emergence of new global players, some of whom are emerging powers and others are established great powers with a long history, but which, due to political circumstances, have been ostracised internationally and are now seeking to return to the forefront of the world's great powers.
- 16) We are witnessing a reconfiguration of the international system based on the rivalry between current, historical and emerging powers (the United States, China, Russia, India, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the EU / US-EU) and the emergence of new geopolitical actors such as Big Tech Companies and so-called disruptive technologies: AI, IAG and quantum computing, the Internet of Things, among others.
- 17) We now have a non-physical realm: cyberspace, from which, in turn, "techplomacy," "tech ambassadors," and "tech embassies" have emerged.
- 18) As for the race to lead the artificial intelligence sector (defence/arms industry), the US Big Tech Companies stand out in competition with their Chinese counterparts. Both countries showed reluctance to commit to strict global regulation, prioritising their strategic and security interests, which reflected geopolitical tensions and differences in the management of AI.
- 19) For its part, the European Union does not have any Big Tech Companies but is moving forward with the EU AI Act (Regulation), a diplomatic instrument through which it seeks to be a global player and a promoter of regulation.
- 20) Techplomacy & the EU AI Act could serve as a diplomatic instrument to promote an international conference, following the model of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (multi-party) to create a global regulatory framework.
- 21) Countries applying Techplomacy, a fusion of foreign policy strategies and security and defence strategies: the United States, India, Australia, France, Germany, Switzerland, Singapore and Estonia. Among the bodies involved, the following stand out: the Tech Czar and the EU Special Envoy to Tech Sector.
- 22) For its part, China uses Techplomacy to influence telecommunications standards (5G, 6G) and artificial intelligence. It has also promoted its "Digital Silk Road" strategy to expand its global technological influence.
- 23) The United States does not have a formal technology ambassador, but its State Department has offices dedicated to cyber and digital policy. Silicon Valley plays a key role in its global influence in AI and cybersecurity.

- 24) The United Kingdom established the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology to take the lead in AI and cybersecurity. It also organised the first AI Security Summit (2023) with technology companies and governments.
- 25) The United Arab Emirates appointed a Minister for Artificial Intelligence to promote its influence in AI and, at the same time, leads international projects on energy technology and smart cities.
- 26) The lack of transparency in AI systems can hinder scrutiny and accountability.
- 27) Looking ahead, it was noted that, during the "Action Summit on Artificial Intelligence (AI)" held in Paris (10–11 February 2025), 58 countries signed a joint declaration. This declaration advocates for inclusive and sustainable AI, emphasising principles such as transparency, ethics and international cooperation. The United States and the United Kingdom did not sign it due to concerns over the definition of global AI governance and its impact on national security. For its part, France announced an investment of €109 billion to boost research and development in artificial intelligence across Europe. The investment will be directed towards training programmes, cross-sector collaboration and the creation of advanced infrastructure, consolidating Europe's position as a leader in AI governance and technology. Furthermore, the EU will contribute €50 billion, whilst the private sector will provide a further €150 billion.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1) Countries must develop Techplomacy (harmonising and merging foreign policy, security and defence strategies into a single framework) in order to address the challenges posed by the misuse of artificial intelligence. To that end, each country must identify its strategic partners, allies in general, competitors and systemic rivals.
- 2) The ethical and global use of AI must be promoted at all levels.
- 3) Multilateral and regional partnerships must be established to maximise the potential of technology.
- 4) AI must be integrated into diplomacy to benefit all sectors of society.
- 5) There is a need to agree on regulatory frameworks for the use of AI.
- 6) It is crucial that the implementation of AI within the judicial system is carried out in an ethical and transparent manner to ensure that these technological tools serve the common good without compromising the rights of the most vulnerable, and that it fully reflects the importance of the judiciary's role in the rule of law.
- 7) The use of AI within the judiciary should not be viewed as a threat because, in reality, it offers necessary and, at times, impressive benefits. In any case, its application must never replace the judge, as human oversight is essential.

Global principles for trustworthy AI:

- 1) The design and implementation of AI tools and services must be compatible with fundamental rights.

10

- 2) Specific measures must be taken to prevent the development or intensification of any form of discrimination between individuals or groups of individuals.
- 3) With regard to the processing of judicial decisions and data, certified sources and intangible data must be used, alongside models designed using a multidisciplinary approach within a secure technological environment.
- 4) It must be ensured that data processing methods are accessible and comprehensible, with external audits permitted.
- 5) A prescriptive approach must be avoided, and it must be ensured that users are informed participants and retain control over their decisions.

V. INDICATORS

PROJECT	OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE	MAIN OBJECTIVE	IMPACT OBJECTIVE
Course: Global Technology Governance: Big Tech Companies & Artificial Intelligence	Strengthen participants' negotiation skills, fostering a deep understanding of how diplomacy can be applied to resolve emerging political and geopolitical challenges within today's global technological landscape, which is characterised by its complexity and dynamism.	Continue these courses so that countries can work together for a better understanding of global technology governance and the role played by Big Tech companies and AI in the global context.	Provide specialized training to help develop and consolidate the professional skills of civil servants in the region, thereby strengthening their ability to meet the challenges of the 21st century in the digital age.
<i>Process indicators</i>	<i>Output indicators</i>	<i>Outcome indicators</i>	<i>Impact indicators</i>
IP1. Number of trainers nominated IP2. Number of hours scheduled for knowledge transfer IP3. Percentage of Member States nominated IP4 Percentage of national officials nominated IP5. Percentage of national officials selected IP6. Percentage of national officials selected by gender IP7. Percentage of English-speaking national officials	IPP1. Percentage of participating trainers IPP2. Percentage of hours dedicated to knowledge transfer IPP3. Percentage of participating Member States IPP4. Percentage of attrition of Member States IPP5. Percentage of national officials attending per general working day IPP6. Percentage of national officials attending 2 working days IPP7. Percentage of national officials attending 1 working day IPP8. Percentage of national officials attending 0 working days IPP9. Percentage of national officials certified	IR1. Percentage of satisfaction of trainees regarding aspects of the training: organisation, performance of trainers, support material and applicability of contents.	II1. Percentage of public institutions that produced evidence-based tools and inputs for the development of negotiating capacities.
Monitoring and evaluation system			
<u>Before:</u> - Design - Viability and feasibility: Institutional/technical/political/budgetary	<u>During:</u> - Execution	<u>After:</u> - No follow-up is foreseen.	

12

VI. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

6.1 Title

Global Technology Governance: Big Tech Companies & Artificial Intelligence

6.2 Counterpart

Officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and academics from the Member States.

6.3 Session host

The digital platform ZOOM was provided by the Latin American and Caribbean Economic System, based in Caracas.

6.4 Overall objective

The course aims to provide participants with the tools they need to analyse the impact of Big Tech companies and artificial intelligence (AI) on the global landscape, with a particular focus on their effects on international relations, geopolitics, the economy and diplomacy.

6.5 Specific objectives:

- Examine how Big Tech companies and technologies have transformed the traditional dynamics of international relations, highlighting the emergence of Techplomacy as a new foreign policy strategy.
- Be able to identify new forms of power, which pose challenges for nation states in areas such as digital sovereignty, cybersecurity and data control.
- Highlight the challenges and opportunities presented by Big Tech companies and artificial intelligence, which are profoundly transforming politics and democracy in countries.
- Distinguish between the benefits and risks of the power wielded by new technology companies, whose influence may raise concerns about digital sovereignty and data control, potentially affecting the autonomy of governments and fairness in democratic processes.

VII. STAGES OF THE PROJECT

7.1 Design

The design stage was developed as of the preparation of SELA's Work Programme for 2025, i.e., since the last quarter of 2024. In this context, the Social Development Coordination held preparatory meetings with representatives of the European Institute of International Studies (IEEI) and the Pontifical University of Salamanca between March and August of that year. During that period, the dates, structure, methodology and contents of the course were defined, in accordance with the areas prioritised in the aforementioned Work Programme, which guided the identification of the profiles of the body of trainers and the selection of suitable professionals to teach the selected topics.

Team of trainers

The team is composed of six highly qualified professionals with extensive expertise in the field of global technology governance: Big Tech companies and artificial intelligence (AI), as well as diplomacy, drawing on both theoretical and practical knowledge, didactic skills to design and facilitate training sessions effectively, and up-to-date on the latest developments in the field of global technology governance and its relevance to diplomacy and international relations; it is therefore crucial to understand which technologies have the potential to influence public opinion, access to information and government transparency, but which can also be used to manipulate elections, spread disinformation and undermine public trust.

Table 1. Team of trainers

	Name	Office	Position	Session
1	José Beraún Aranibar	European Institute of International Studies (IEEI - Sweden)	Professor at the European Institute of International Studies (IEEI)	Challenges and opportunities for foreign services in the digital age
2	Mario Torres Jarrín	European Institute of International Studies (IEEI - Sweden)	Director of the Institute of European Studies and Human Rights of the Pontifical University of Salamanca	Big Tech companies, artificial intelligence and international relations: Techplomacy
3	Jesús Argumosa	European Institute of International Studies (IEEI - Sweden)	Director of the Chair in Geopolitics and Strategic Studies at the European Institute of International Studies (Sweden)	Artificial intelligence and geopolitics
4	Antonio Núñez y García Saúco	European Institute of International Studies (IEEI - Sweden)	Professor at the European Institute of International Studies (IEEI)	Regulation and global governance of artificial intelligence
5	Naiara Posenato	European Institute of International Studies (IEEI - Sweden)	Lecturer at the University of Milan (Italy) and Research Fellow at the European Institute of International Studies (Sweden)	Artificial intelligence and the judiciary
6	Alejandro Garofali Acosta	European Institute of International Studies (IEEI - Sweden)	President of the European Institute of International Studies (IEEI)	Challenges and opportunities for foreign services in the digital age

- **Work agenda**

The course was structured in two daily rounds, four thematic sessions, two 1.5 and six 1-hour sessions, from 9:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. with a half-hour break. Presentations were combined with discussion spaces in which specialists and officials exchanged points of view.

14

7.2 Convening, applications and selection

The period for applications began on 9 April 2025 with the sending of Note Verbale N° SP-25/0186-018 to the representatives of the membership to the Latin American Council, requesting them to disseminate the invitation among the relevant Ministries through the registration form contained in the following link: <https://forms.office.com/r/AWT5sxd074>. Applications closed on 9 May 2024.

On Friday, 9 May, the period for applications closed, and 107 applications were received from 14 Member States of SELA. Of the 107 national officials who applied, 105 were selected to participate in the training in accordance with the established criteria, but only 49 completed the course, reducing the number of countries attending the course to 12.

As a result, 43.48% of the membership welcomed and complied with the convocation and 99% of the applicants were selected in accordance with the established criteria. Of the 30 final participants, there was an average representation per Member State of 3.3 officials.

It should be noted that 100% of the officials who completed the course are representatives from Latin America. There were no officials from English-speaking countries despite the fact that simultaneous interpretation into English was provided. Regarding participation by gender, the distribution was 47% male and 53% female officials.

Table 2. Participating and non-participating Member States

	Participating	Non-participating	
1	Argentina	Bahamas	
2	Bolivia	Barbados	
3	Colombia	Belize	
4	Cuba	Chile	
5	Ecuador	El Salvador	
6	Mexico	Guyana	
7	Nicaragua	Haiti	
8	Paraguay	Honduras	
9	Peru	Panama	
10	Dominican Republic	Suriname	
11	Uruguay	Trinidad and Tobago	
12	Venezuela		
	Participating		12
	Non-participating		11
	TOTAL		23
			52.17%
			47.83%




Table 3. Number of officials attending per Member State

Participating countries	Number of attendees
ARGENTINA	1
BOLIVIA	1
COLOMBIA	1
CUBA	5
ECUADOR	12
MEXICO	2
NICARAGUA	2
PARAGUAY	3
PERU	6
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	12
URUGUAY	1
VENEZUELA	3
Total	49

16




Table 4. Participating officials by language

Total number of Spanish-speaking officials	49
Total number of English-speaking officials	0





Table 5. Distribution of national officials selected by gender

Total female officials	23	46.94%
Total male officials	26	53.06%
TOTAL	49	



4.3 Execution

The activity was 100% completed: the attendance of the eight trainers; the timetable of the activity was distributed in two rounds per day, 9 hours of training at a rate of 4.5 hours per day with a half-hour break.

Table 6. Participating Member States and attrition rate

Participating Member States and attrition rate	
Total Member States participating	12
Total Member States absent	2
Total Member States nominated	14

18



Table 7. Percentage of officials certified

Officials certified		
	No. officials	Percentage
Officials attending both sessions	49	46.67%
Officials not attending sessions	56	53.33%
Total	105	100.00%



7.4 Monitoring and evaluation

- This training does not include **indicators for medium- and long-term results**. Impact indicators are not contemplated because there is no follow-up process with the participants.

The certificate of attendance to the course was sent to the officials on 5 June 2025.

7.5 Deliverables

Material for distribution and use by Member States.

- Publication of a book by SELA with a chapter on each topic presented by the facilitators, entitled Ethical Governance of Artificial Intelligence: Large Technological Enterprises, Artificial Intelligence and Global Technological Governance.

VIII. SWOT MATRIX

Strengths	Opportunities
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SELA's capacity to coordinate with strategic partners in order to agree on joint actions for the benefit of its Member States. • The experience of trainers and the relevant, up-to-date contents made it possible to address directly and specifically current needs for knowledge about the potential and challenges of large technology companies and artificial intelligence. • The course met the objectives of the activity. • The participants' contributions provided valuable insights that helped focus the discussions. • The simultaneous interpretation service was highly satisfactory. • The publication of the facilitators' presentations in book format was announced. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This course allows the issue of the complexity of governance of large technology companies and artificial intelligence to be included in the design of public policies and international strategies. • It raises awareness that large technology companies and artificial intelligence are subjects of study and understanding for governments, public institutions, companies, civil society and citizens. • It develops and deepens the professional skills of its officials in the application of diplomacy to resolve emerging political and geopolitical challenges in today's global technological context, characterised by its complexity and dynamism. • It strengthens cooperation between academic institutions, cooperation agencies and governments on issues related to large technology companies and AI.
Weaknesses	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The trainers did not share the support material presented in each session. • The design of the training in terms of number of days and hours dedicated to each topic made the sessions very long. • There was little space for interaction with the attendees. In some cases, the presentations were a bit tedious due to the short breaks between them. • It was not possible to maintain the interest of 100% of the registered participants throughout the course. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Delivering courses of similar contents consecutively could affect the attention span of the participants in terms of their ability to pay attention, as there are many hours in a row with little time for breaks, and because of time constraints in their respective fields of work.

22

IX. INDICATOR MATRICES

9.1 Concentration of indicators

TIPO	N°	CÓDIGO	INDICADOR DESCRIPCIÓN	VALOR		RESULTADO
				PROYECTADO	REAL	
O S E C O R P S O C T U D O R P R S U L T A D O S	1	IP1	NÚMERO DE CAPACITADORES POSTULADOS	6	6	LÍNEA BASE
	2	IP2	NÚMERO DE HORAS PROGRAMADAS PARA LA TRANSFERENCIA DE CONOCIMIENTOS	9	9	LÍNEA BASE
	3	IP3	PORCENTAJE ESTADOS MIEMBROS POSTULADOS	23	14	60,86%
	4	IP4	PORCENTAJE DE FUNCIONARIOS NACIONALES POSTULADOS	107	105	98,13%
	5	IP5	PORCENTAJE DE FUNCIONARIOS NACIONALES SELECCIONADOS	105	49	46,66%
	6	IP6	PORCENTAJE DE FUNCIONARIOS POR GÉNERO	23	23	100%%
	7	IP7	PORCENTAJE DE FUNCIONARIOS NACIONALES ANGLOPARLANTES	8	0	0
	8	IPP1	PORCENTAJE DE CAPACITADORES QUE ASISTIERON	6	6	100%
	9	IPP2	PORCENTAJE DE HORAS PROGRAMADAS PARA LA TRANSFERENCIA DE CONOCIMIENTO	9	9	100%
	10	IPP3	PORCENTAJE ESTADOS MIEMBROS PARTICIPANTES	14	12	85,71%%
	11	IPP4	PORCENTAJE DE DESERCIÓN DE ESTADOS MIEMBROS	14	2	14,28%
	12	IPP5	PORCENTAJE DE FUNCIONARIOS NACIONALES ASISTENTE	105	49	46,66%
	13	IPP6	PORCENTAJE DE FUNCIONARIOS ASISTENTES A 2 JORNADAS	49	49	100%%
	14	IPP7	PORCENTAJE DE FUNCIONARIOS ASISTENTES A 1 JORNADA	49	49	100%%
	15	IPP8	PORCENTAJE DE FUNCIONARIOS EN NINGUNA JORNADA	0	0	0
	16	IPP9	PORCENTAJE DE FUNCIONARIOS CERTIFICADOS	49	49	100
17	IR1	NO HAY PORCENTAJE DE SATISFACCIÓN DE LOS CAPACITADOS EN CUANTO A LOS ASPECTOS DE LA CAPACITACIÓN: ORGANIZACIÓN, DESEMPEÑO DE LOS CAPACITADORES, MATERIAL DE APOYO, APLICABILIDAD DEL CONTENIDO, DISTRIBUCIÓN DEL TIEMPO EN SESIONES DEBIDO A QUE NO SE REALIZÓ NINGUNA ENCUESTA DE SATISFACCIÓN.				

COMO SE MENCIONÓ ANTERIORMENTE NO HAY RESULTADOS DE IMPACTO PORQUE NO HAY INFORMACIÓN SOBRE EL USO DE LOS CONOCIMIENTOS IMPARTIDOS PARA LA FORMULACIÓN DE POLÍTICAS PÚBLICAS

9.2 Process indicators

Indicator		Calculation formula	Unit	Result	Collection method	Collection period
IP1	Number of trainers nominated	Baseline	Experts	8	SELA-IEEI Consultations	Approximately 3 months
IP2	Number of hours scheduled for knowledge transfer	Baseline	Hours	9	Team of trainers	
IP3	Percentage of Member States nominated	$\frac{14 \text{ Member States nominated}}{23 \text{ Member States invited}} \times 100$	%	60.86%	Application Form	1 month: between 09/04 and 09/05
IP4	Percentage of national officials nominated	$\frac{105 \text{ national officials nominated}}{107 \text{ national officials expected}} \times 100$	%	98.13%	Application Form	
IP5	Percentage of national officials selected	$\frac{49 \text{ national officials selected}}{105 \text{ national officials nominated}} \times 100$	%	46.66%	Application Form	
IP6	Percentage of national officials selected by gender	$\frac{23 \text{ female national officials nominated}}{23 \text{ female national officials selected}} \times 100$	%	100%	Application Form	
IP7	Percentage of national officials selected who are English-speaking	$\frac{0 \text{ English-speaking officials attended}}{8 \text{ national officials nominated}} \times 100$	%	0%	Application Form	

24

9.3 Output indicators

Indicator		Calculation formula	Unit	Result	Collection method
IPP1	Percentage of trainers who attended	$\frac{6 \text{ trainers in attendance}}{6 \text{ trainers invited}} \times 100$	%	100%	Activity log generated by the Zoom platform
IPP2	Percentage of hours dedicated to knowledge transfer	$\frac{9 \text{ hours dedicated}}{9 \text{ hours planned}} \times 100$	%	100%	
IPP3	Percentage of participating Member States	$\frac{12 \text{ participating Member States}}{14 \text{ non-participating Member States}} \times 100$	%	85.71%%	
IPP4	Percentage of attrition of Member States	$\frac{2 \text{ Member States absent}}{14 \text{ Member States expected}} \times 100$	%	14.28%%	
IPP5	Percentage of national officials attending	$\frac{30 \text{ Member States attending}}{76 \text{ Member States expected}} \times 100$	%	39.47%	
IPP6	Percentage of officials attending at least one day	$\frac{49 \text{ Member States attending}}{105 \text{ Member States expected}} \times 100$	%	46.66%	
IPP7	Percentage of officials attending 2 days	$\frac{\text{Officials attending only 2 days}}{49 \text{ officials attending}} \times 100$ 49 officials participating	%	100%	
IPP8	Percentage of officials not attending any day	$\frac{\text{Officials not attending any day}}{0 \text{ officials not attending}} \times 100$ 49 officials participating	%	0	
IPP9	Percentage of national officials certified	$\frac{49 \text{ officials completing}}{49 \text{ officials participating}} \times 100$	%	100%	